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purpose of section 8 (b) (4). 3° Regarding this point, it is of consequence that
the Board has similarly rejected per se rules as applicable to section 8(b) (4)
(i), and concluded that any determination should be based on all the evidence
in the particular case and not by an a priori assumption. 31
Based on this rejection of blanket rules and upon the absence of any
statutory language which could reveal any intent to radically alter judicial
precedent, the Court has correctly interpreted that what Congress condemned
as coercion was not picketing per se but only picketing which is the equivalent
of a boycott against the secondary employer generally. This would seem to
be in keeping with its determination in NLRB v. Drivers Local 639 that
"[S]ection 13 [of the Act] is a command of Congress to the courts to re-
solve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation . . . which safe-
guards the right to strike."82
In the final evaluation of the decision, it must be emphasized that in
validating consumer picketing, when limited to the struck produce, the Court
does so on the finding that the appeal did not affect the secondary employer
in any way except through the medium of customer product preference. Even
allowing for the limiting effect of these controlled circumstances on the
decision, an increase of union activity in the area of consumer appeals is
to be expected, not necessarily limited to the utilization of placard-carrying
union members. 33
PETER J. NORTON
Patents—Torts—Inventor's Right to Professional Credit—"Droit
Moral"—Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.—Misani
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp) 
—Defendant employed plaintiff as a chem-
ist, subject to a standard assignment to the defendant of all plaintiff's in-
ventions developed during her employment. Plaintiff claimed that, while so
employed, she invented a chemical compound and the process for making it.
Plaintiff's supervisor, also a defendant, alleged that this discovery was made
under his direction as part of a long-term inventive process in which he was
developing the compound. On this basis, and as agent for the defendant
company, he filed for a patent, naming himself as inventor. Following the
issuance of the patent, plaintiff protested defendant's claim to inventorship,
but her protest was dissolved when the Patent Office disallowed the patent
on the ground that the compound was unpatentable. Although defendant
3° United Wholesale Employees Local 261 v. NLRB, 282 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Brewery Workers Local 366, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959).
31
 Brief for Respondents, pp. 10-11, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Ware-
housemen, Local 760, supra note 1.
22
 362 U.S. 274, 282 (1959).
33
 The International Ladies Garment Workers Union has distributed to the general
public shopping bags bearing the message, "JUDY BOND INC. ON STRIKE—DON'T
BUY JUDY BOND BLOUSES," thereby creating, in effect, consumer pickets, an in-
teresting innovation. Barmash, Behind Those Shopping Bags, N.Y. Herald Tribune, July
26, 1964 (Magazine), p. 10.
83 N.J. Super. 1, 198 A.2d 791 (1964).
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had specifically claimed only the compound, he had described the process for
obtaining it in his application. Plaintiff subsequently obtained a patent on
the process in her own name, and now contends that the descriptive inclusion
of the process in defendant's application gave implied credit to him for its
invention, even though he had not specifically claimed it. She claimed, then,
that for the period of time between the issuance and public record of the
patent to defendant, and the issuance of her own subsequent process-patent,
she was deprived of her right to claim intellectual and professional credit
for the invention of the process, and that this deprivation constituted a
cause of action sounding in tort. At trial, the jury rejected the claim, finding
no cause of action in the deprivation of intellectual credit for an invention.
On appeal, reversing and remanding for retrial, the court HELD: The
assignment of patent rights did not include the assignment of the right to
intellectual credit for the invention, and the deprivation of this right gave
rise to a cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage.
Both the statutes2 and the Patent Office regulations 3 require that, in
general, the only proper applicant for a patent is the inventor himself. 4
Exceptions to the general rule occur when the inventor is dead or legally
incapacitated," or, when patent rights have been assigned to another and
the inventor refuses to apply or cannot be found.° In these instances, the
assignee or other party showing "sufficient proprietary interest" 7 in the
acquisition of the patent may apply, but in all cases the application must
indicate the true inventor.
Similarly, the oath or affirmation required of all applicants attests that
the applicant is the actual inventor, and the statute provides for variations
in the form of the oath when someone other than the inventor himself ap-
plies for the patent under one or other of the relevant exceptions.° Thus, a
patent must be supported by the oath of the "original and first" inventor,
whether or not patent rights issue to him or his assignee.° A false oath
voids whatever patent may issue as a result of the process containing the
perj ury. 1 °
Such extensive statutory insistence upon naming the true inventor lays a
reasonable, though not explicit, basis for the court's inference in this case
2
 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—... .
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented . . . .
66 Stat. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1958) provides: Application for patent
shall be made by the inventor ... .
a 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(a) (1960): "A patent must be applied for and the application
papers must be signed and the necessary oath executed by the actual inventor in all
cases . . . ."
4 Wende v. Horine, 191 Fed. 620 (N.D. Ill. 1911).
6 66 Stat. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 117 (1958) ; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.42, 1.43 (1960).
66 Stat. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 118 (1958) ; 37 C.F.R. § 1.47(b) (1960).
7 37 C.F.R. § 1.47(b) (1960).
8 66 Stat. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1958) ; 37 C.F.R. § 1.65 (1960).
9 Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S. 667, 672 (1888), Standard Oil Development Co. v.
James B. Berry Sons Co., 92 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1937).
10 Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 38 F. Supp. 520, 526
(ND. Ohio 1941).
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that the law protects an inventor's interest in having credit for his invention.
Though possibly novel in its formulation, the claim for such credit derives
naturally from the stated requirements concerning the authentic inventor.
In the instant case, the court denominates the claimed right as the
"professional right of intellectual credit,'"' and interprets it as a property
right in that its possession affects its holder's economic status as part of
his bargaining power in securing future employment. In some ways this
right resembles the European concept of "droit moral" or moral right of an
author, composer, or other intellectual worker to the honor and reputation
stemming from his creativity. Analytically separate from the protection
offered by copyright laws, the author's personal, moral right has, at least
since 1909, found statutory protection in several South American and Euro-
pean countrie,s,12 and in France the doctrine has received "official [judicial]
recognition" since 1901.' 3
 Gradually, international copyright conventions
adopted this concept, extending its protection to citizens of participating
countries."
Prior to the Universal Copyright Convention, signed at Geneva in 1952,
the concept of moral right was not an apparent adjunct to American copy-
right theory." This Convention, however, which has been adopted by the
United States," approaches the concept of "droit moral" in Article V, 1:
"Copyright shall include the exclusive right of the author to make, publish,
and authorize the making and publication of translations of works protected
under this Convention," and in Article V, 2, paragraph 5: "The original title
and the name of the author ... shall be printed on all copies of the published
translation."'T While not specifying the precise nature of the rights thus
protected, these sections of the Convention have nonetheless been interpreted
as referring to "prerogatives which, in the European copyright terminology,
are nothing else but moral rights.""
Where, therefore, copyright, primarily protects an economic interest
flowing from personal creativity, the doctrine of moral right protects "the
personality of creators as such and as expressed in their works."" It is an
inalienabIe, 20
 personal, non-pecuniary (though valuable) right, covering
11 Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Super. 1, 11, 198 A,2d 791, 797,
supra note 1.
12 Bolivia was apparently the first country to legislate specifically on behalf of
"droit moral." 2 Olagnier, Le Droit d'Auteur 48 (1935).
13
 Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: a Study in the Law of Artists, Authors
and Creators, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 556 (1940).
Copinger and Skone Jones, Law of Copyright 347 (9th ed. 1958).
15 Roeder, supra note 13, at 557:
Busy with the economic exploitation of her vast natural wealth, America
has, perhaps, neglected the arts; in any event American legal doctrine has done
so, and the paucity of material outside the copyright law on the rights of
creators forms a vivid contrast to continental jurisprudence. See also 48 Yale
L.J. 715 (1939).
16 6 U.S.T. 2731 (1952) ; 17 U.S.C. § 9(c) (Supp. V, 1964).
17 68 Stat. 1030 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
18), Bogsch, Universal Copyright Convention—An Analysis and Commentary 67(1958
19 Roeder, supra note 13, at 578.
20 Wittenberg, The Law of Literary Property 111 (1957).
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the author's good name and credit derived from his creativity, and the
integrity of the work itself. 2 ' Although the United States has adopted the
Universal Copyright Convention, the language of moral right does not appear
to have been incorporated into federal copyright law, unless Section 1 of
the Act of July 30, 1947,22
 which grants initial protection to authors and
others falling within the scope of the Act, may be broadly construed so as
to extend its protection to an author's honor and reputation as well as his
economic interests.
Even in Europe, moral right doctrine appears limited to intellectual
workers as opposed to technical inventors. The feeling seems to be that
the latter are fully capable of taking care of their own interests while writers
and intellectuals need special care:
alors que la plupart des industrials son de puissants capitalistes, la
plupart des auteurs sont, a Ieurs debuts, et trop souvent pendant
toute leur carriere de malheureux travailleurs, qui trainent toute
leur vie une misere plus ou moins doree.23
This preference for artists over inventors colors the common law tradition
as well, although not as effectively as in Europe: "Had Milton not written
the Paradise Lost it would never have been written; had Watt not found
the application of steam under high pressure another would have found it." 24
Although the plaintiff in the instant case claims a right which derives from
her inventive creativity, the court acted in accord with an honored tradition
by refusing to consider the violation of the right as an invasion of personal
integrity. Rather, it placed the right on a par with other aspects of plaintiff's
bargaining power, thus achieving the far less revolutionary, but much more
legally oriented, ground of interference with prospective economic advantage.
Merely to possess a right, however, is not necessarily to possess a cause
of action for a violation of that right. The phrase "damnum absque injuria"
clearly implies that while a right may be violated (damnum), the violation
may not constitute legally recognizable harm (injuria). 25 To render the
violation actionable, a legally grounded duty must run from defendant to
plaintiff with respect to the right at issue, 25 and compensable loss, occasioned
by failure to respect the right, must follow. Granting, then, as the court in
the instant case did, the existence of the right to intellectual credit for an
invention, the issue is not merely whether the right falls into an established
tort category, but whether, in fact, the elements of duty and damage are
21 According to Olagnier, supra note 12, at 54-55, protection of moral right extends
even beyond the period of copyright protection.
22 66 Stat. 752 (1952), 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
23 "For while the majority of industrial people are powerful capitalists, the majority
of authors are, at the start and, too often, throughout their careers, unhappy laborers
who trail a somewhat gilded poverty their whole lives through." Olagnier, supra note 12,
at 54.
24 22 Halsbury, Laws of England 217, cited, ut sic, in Legislation Safeguarding the
Interests of the Inventor (Das Recht des Schapferischen Menschen) 44 (1936). Search
through the second (Hailsham) edition (1936) and Lord Symonds' edition (1953) of
Halsbury failed to unearth this somewhat Pecksniffian observation of Lord Halsbury's.
25 See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938).
20 Roach v. Hostetter, 48 Cal. App. 2d 375,.119 P.2d 749•(1941).
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sufficiently present to justify recovery.27 In its decision, the court restricted
itself merely to announcing the existence of the right to intellectual credit,
without elaborating on its protection other than by asserting that "vindication
of the claim ... is readily assimilable to the principle of an action for inter-
ference with prospective economic advantage." 28
Interference with another's obtaining employment, other than in a
legitimate competitive situation, is not a novel tort. 22 Yet to use such inter-
ference as the basis for a cause of action, the plaintiff must show that it
was intentiona1, 3° and, in New Jersey, the situs of the instant case, that it
was wanton, malicious, 31 and unjustifiable. 32 As stated in Louis Kamm, Inc.
v. Flink,33 interference with the right "to enjoy the fruits and advantages
of [one's] own enterprise, industry, skill and credit" is actionable, but only
if it is "without the justification of competition or the service of any interest
or lawful purpose." The necessity of proving an intent to interfere fed by
malice is obvious. Should the defendant in such an action be found to have
received a patent under an honest mistake as to his inventorship, or in ig-,
norance (inexcusable as it may be) of the clear mandate that applications
be filed in the name of the true inventor, it could not be said that he intended
to interfere with the plaintiff's existing or prospective economic advantage.
The law's desire to protect intellectual credit should surely not create what
would be a strict liability on a person who blunders, mistakenly or stupidly,
onto that privileged field.
The importance of the instant decision lies in its enunciation of the
right to intellectual and professional credit for inventions, and not in what-
ever hope it may raise in the plaintiff that she will prevail on this theory
should the case reach re-trial. For the facts as explained in the decision give
little indication of the defendants' intent in making the original appli-
cation in the name of the defendant supervisor. The plaintiff has, however,
a new chance to explore these issues and for this reason the instant decision,
apart from its value as a contribution to the continuing elaboration of pro-
tectible rights, is to be admired.
ROBERT J. MULDOON, JR.
Taxation—Priority of Federal Tax Lien—United States v. Vermont. 1—
In October, 1958, the state of Vermont made an assessment and demand for
withheld state income taxes of $1628 due from Cutting & Trimming, Inc., a
Vermont taxpayer. Under state law a tax lien for the amount due, plus
27 See Prosser, Torts 3-4 (1955).
28 Misani v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 83 N.J. Supe
supra note 1.
29 See Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 259 Ala. 656,
39 Dade Enterprises v. Wometco Theatres, 119 Fla. 70,
31 George F. Hewson Co. v. Hopper, 130 N.J.L. 525, 33 A.
32 Stein v, Schmitz, 21 N.J. Misc. 218, 32 A.2d 844 (1943)
82 113 N.J.L. 582, 587, 175 A. 62, 66 (1934), cited with
Corp. v. American Federation of Labor, Local 23132, 6 N.J.
68 So. 2d 314 (1953).
160 So. 209 (1935).
2d 889 (1943).
approval in Outdoor Sports
217, 78 A.2d 69, 75 (1951).
r. 1, 13, 198 A.2d 791, 798,
1 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
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